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Abstract
The automatic identification of propaganda
has gained significance in recent years due to
technological and social changes in the way
news is generated and consumed. That this
task can be addressed effectively using BERT,
a powerful new architecture which can be fine-
tuned for text classification tasks, is not sur-
prising. However, propaganda detection, like
other tasks that deal with news documents and
other forms of decontextualized social com-
munication (e.g. sentiment analysis), inher-
ently deals with data whose categories are si-
multaneously imbalanced and dissimilar. We
show that BERT, while capable of handling
imbalanced classes with no additional data
augmentation, does not generalise well when
the training and test data are sufficiently dis-
similar (as is often the case with news sources,
whose topics evolve over time). We show how
to address this problem by providing a statisti-
cal measure of similarity between datasets and
a method of incorporating cost-weighting into
BERT when the training and test sets are dis-
similar. We test these methods on the Propa-
ganda Techniques Corpus (PTC) and achieve
the second highest score on sentence-level pro-
paganda classification.
1 Introduction
The challenges of imbalanced classification—in
which the proportion of elements in each class
for a classification task significantly differ—and of
the ability to generalise on dissimilar data have re-
mained important problems in Natural Language
Processing (NLP) and Machine Learning in gen-
eral. Popular NLP tasks including sentiment anal-
ysis, propaganda detection, and event extraction
from social media are all examples of imbalanced
classification problems. In each case the num-
ber of elements in one of the classes (e.g. nega-
tive sentiment, propagandistic content, or specific
events discussed on social media, respectively) is
significantly lower than the number of elements in
the other classes.
The recently introduced BERT language model
for transfer learning (Devlin et al., 2018) uses a
deep bidirectional transformer architecture to pro-
duce pre-trained context-dependent embeddings.
It has proven to be powerful in solving many NLP
tasks and, as we find, also appears to handle imbal-
anced classification well, thus removing the need
to use standard methods of data augmentation to
mitigate this problem (see Section 2.2.2 for related
work and Section 4.1 for analysis).
BERT is credited with the ability to adapt to
many tasks and data with very little training (De-
vlin et al., 2018). However, we show that BERT
fails to perform well when the training and test
data are significantly dissimilar, as is the case with
several tasks that deal with social and news data.
In these cases, the training data is necessarily a
subset of past data, while the model is likely to
be used on future data which deals with different
topics. This work addresses this problem by incor-
porating cost-sensitivity (Section 4.2) into BERT.
We test these methods by participating in the
Shared Task on Fine-Grained Propaganda Detec-
tion for the 2nd Workshop on NLP for Internet
Freedom, for which we achieve the second rank on
sentence-level classification of propaganda, con-
firming the importance of cost-sensitivity when
the training and test sets are dissimilar.
1.1 Detecting Propaganda
The term ‘propaganda’ derives from propagare
in post-classical Latin, as in “propagation of the
faith” (Auerbach and Castronovo, 2014), and thus
has from the beginning been associated with an
intentional and potentially multicast communica-
tion; only later did it become a pejorative term.
It was pragmatically defined in the World War II
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era as “the expression of an opinion or an action
by individuals or groups deliberately designed to
influence the opinions or the actions of other indi-
viduals or groups with reference to predetermined
ends” (Institute for Propaganda Analysis, 1937).
For the philosopher and sociologist Jacques El-
lul, however, in a society with mass communica-
tion, propaganda is inevitable and thus it is nec-
essary to become more aware of it (Ellul, 1973);
but whether or not to classify a given strip of text
as propaganda depends not just on its content but
on its use on the part of both addressers and ad-
dressees (Auerbach and Castronovo, 2014, 6), and
this fact makes the automated detection of propa-
ganda intrinsically challenging.
Despite this difficulty, interest in automatically
detecting misinformation and/or propaganda has
gained significance due to the exponential growth
in online sources of information combined with
the speed with which information is shared today.
The sheer volume of social interactions makes
it impossible to manually check the veracity of
all information being shared. Automation thus
remains a potentially viable method of ensuring
that we continue to enjoy the benefits of a con-
nected world without the spread of misinformation
through either ignorance or malicious intent.
In the task introduced by Da San Martino et al.
(2019), we are provided with articles tagged as
propaganda at the sentence and fragment (or span)
level and are tasked with making predictions on a
development set followed by a final held-out test
set. We note this gives us access to the articles in
the development and test sets but not their labels.
We participated in this task under the team name
ProperGander and were placed 2nd on the sen-
tence level classification task where we make use
of our methods of incorporating cost-sensitivity
into BERT. We also participated in the fragment
level task and were placed 7th. The significant con-
tributions of this work are:
• We show that common (‘easy’) methods of
data augmentation for dealing with class im-
balance do not improve base BERT perfor-
mance.
• We provide a statistical method of establish-
ing the similarity of datasets.
• We incorporate cost-sensitivity into BERT to
enable models to adapt to dissimilar datasets.
• We release all our program code on GitHub
and Google Colaboratory1, so that other re-
searchers can benefit from this work.
2 Related work
2.1 Propaganda detection
Most of the existing works on propaganda detec-
tion focus on identifying propaganda at the news
article level, or even at the news outlet level with
the assumption that each of the articles of the
suspected propagandistic outlet are propaganda
(Rashkin et al., 2017; Barro´n-Ceden˜o et al., 2019).
Here we study two tasks that are more
fine-grained, specifically propaganda detection
at the sentence and phrase (fragment) levels
(Da San Martino et al., 2019). This fine-grained
setup aims to train models that identify linguistic
propaganda techniques rather than distinguishing
between the article source styles.
Da San Martino et al. (2019) were the first
to propose this problem setup and release it
as a shared task.2 Along with the released
dataset, Da San Martino et al. (2019) proposed
a multi-granularity neural network, which uses the
deep bidirectional transformer architecture known
as BERT, which features pre-trained context-
dependent embeddings (Devlin et al., 2018). Their
system takes a joint learning approach to the
sentence- and phrase-level tasks, concatenating
the output representation of the less granular
(sentence-level) task with the more fine-grained
task using learned weights.
In this work we also take the BERT model as
the basis of our approach and focus on the class
imbalance as well as the lack of similarity between
training and test data inherent to the task.
2.2 Class imbalance
A common issue for many Natural Language Pro-
cessing (NLP) classification tasks is class imbal-
ance, the situation where one of the class cate-
gories comprises a significantly larger proportion
of the dataset than the other classes. It is especially
prominent in real-world datasets and complicates
classification when the identification of the minor-
ity class is of specific importance.
Models trained on the basis of minimising er-
rors for imbalanced datasets tend to more fre-
1http://www.harishmadabushi.com/
research/propaganda-detection/
2https://propaganda.qcri.org/
nlp4if-shared-task/
quently predict the majority class; achieving high
accuracy in such cases can be misleading. Be-
cause of this, the macro-averaged F-score, chosen
for this competition, is a more suitable metric as it
weights the performance on each class equally.
As class imbalance is a widespread issue, multi-
ple techniques have been developed that help alle-
viate it (Buda et al., 2018; Haixiang et al., 2017),
by either adjusting the model (e.g. changing the
performance metric) or changing the data (e.g.
oversampling the minority class or undersampling
the majority class).
2.2.1 Cost-sensitive learning
Cost-sensitive classification can be used when the
“cost” of mislabelling one class is higher than that
of mislabelling other classes (Elkan, 2001; Kukar
et al., 1998). For example, the real cost to a bank
of miscategorising a large fraudulent transaction
as authentic is potentially higher than miscate-
gorising (perhaps only temporarily) a valid trans-
action as fraudulent. Cost-sensitive learning tack-
les the issue of class imbalance by changing the
cost function of the model such that misclassi-
fication of training examples from the minority
class carries more weight and is thus more ‘ex-
pensive’. This is achieved by simply multiplying
the loss of each example by a certain factor. This
cost-sensitive learning technique takes misclassi-
fication costs into account during model training,
and does not modify the imbalanced data distribu-
tion directly.
2.2.2 Data augmentation
Common methods that tackle the problem of
class imbalance by modifying the data to cre-
ate balanced datasets are undersampling and over-
sampling. Undersampling randomly removes in-
stances from the majority class and is only suitable
for problems with an abundance of data. Over-
sampling means creating more minority class in-
stances to match the size of the majority class.
Oversampling methods range from simple random
oversampling, i.e. repeating the training proce-
dure on instances from the minority class, cho-
sen at random, to the more complex, which in-
volves constructing synthetic minority-class sam-
ples. Random oversampling is similar to cost-
sensitive learning as repeating the sample several
times makes the cost of its mis-classification grow
proportionally. Kolomiyets et al. (2011), Zhang
et al. (2015), and Wang and Yang (2015) per-
form data augmentation using synonym replace-
ment, i.e. replacing random words in sentences
with their synonyms or nearest-neighbor embed-
dings, and show its effectiveness on multiple tasks
and datasets. Wei et al. (2019) provide a great
overview of ‘easy’ data augmentation (EDA) tech-
niques for NLP, including synonym replacement
as described above, and random deletion, i.e. re-
moving words in the sentence at random with
pre-defined probability. They show the effective-
ness of EDA across five text classification tasks.
However, they mention that EDA may not lead to
substantial improvements when using pre-trained
models. In this work we test this claim by com-
paring performance gains of using cost-sensitive
learning versus two data augmentation methods,
synonym replacement and random deletion, with
a pre-trained BERT model.
More complex augmentation methods include
back-translation (Sennrich et al., 2015), transla-
tional data augmentation (Fadaee et al., 2017), and
noising (Xie et al., 2017), but these are out of the
scope of this study.
3 Dataset
The Propaganda Techniques Corpus (PTC) dataset
for the 2019 Shared Task on Fine-Grained Pro-
paganda consists of a training set of 350 news
articles, consisting of just over 16,965 total sen-
tences, in which specifically propagandistic frag-
ments have been manually spotted and labelled by
experts. This is accompanied by a development
set (or dev set) of 61 articles with 2,235 total sen-
tences, whose labels are maintained by the shared
task organisers; and two months after the release
of this data, the organisers released a test set of 86
articles and 3,526 total sentences. In the training
set, 4,720 (∼ 28%) of the sentences have been as-
sessed as containing propaganda, with 12,245 sen-
tences (∼ 72%) as non-propaganda, demonstrat-
ing a clear class imbalance.
In the binary sentence-level classification (SLC)
task, a model is trained to detect whether each
and every sentence is either ’propaganda’ or ’non-
propaganda’; in the more challenging field-level
classification (FLC) task, a model is trained to
detect one of 18 possible propaganda technique
types in spans of characters within sentences.
These propaganda types are listed in Da San Mar-
tino et al. (2019) and range from those which
might be recognisable at the lexical level (e.g.
NAME CALLING, REPETITION), and those which
would likely need to incorporate semantic under-
standing (RED HERRING, STRAW MAN).3
For several example sentences from a sample
document annotated with fragment-level classi-
fications (FLC) (Figure 1). The corresponding
sentence-level classification (SLC) labels would
indicate that sentences 3, 4, and 7 are ’propa-
ganda’ while the the other sentences are ‘non-
propaganda’.
3.1 Data Distribution
One of the most interesting aspects of the data pro-
vided for this task is the notable difference be-
tween the training and the development/test sets.
We emphasise that this difference is realistic and
reflective of real world news data, in which major
stories are often accompanied by the introduction
of new terms, names, and even phrases. This is
because the training data is a subset of past data
while the model is to be used on future data which
deals with different newsworthy topics.
We demonstrate this difference statistically by
using a method for finding the similarity of cor-
pora suggested by Kilgarriff (2001). We use
the Wilcoxon signed-rank test (Wilcoxon, 1945)
which compares the frequency counts of randomly
sampled elements from different datasets to deter-
mine if those datasets have a statistically similar
distribution of elements.
We implement this as follows. For each of the
training, development and test sets, we extract all
words (retaining the repeats) while ignoring a set
of stopwords (identified through the Python Nat-
ural Language Toolkit). We then extract 10,000
samples (with replacements) for various pairs of
these datasets (training, development, and test sets
along with splits of each of these datasets). Fi-
nally, we use comparative word frequencies from
the two sets to calculate the p-value using the
Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Table 1 provides the
minimum and maximum p-values and their inter-
pretations for ten such runs of each pair reported.
With p-value less than 0.05, we show that the train,
development and test sets are self-similar and also
significantly different from each other. In mea-
suring self-similarity, we split each dataset after
shuffling all sentences. While this comparison is
made at the sentence level (as opposed to the arti-
3https://propaganda.qcri.org/
annotations/ includes a flowchart instructing annotators
to discover and isolate these 18 propaganda categories.
Set 1 Set 2 p-value(min)
p-value
(max)
% Similar
Tests
50%
Train
50%
Train 2.38E-01 9.11E-01
100
50% Dev 50% Dev 5.55E-01 9.96E-01 100
50% Test 50% Test 6.21E-01 8.88E-01 100
25% Dev 75% Dev 1.46E-01 5.72E-01 100
25% Test 75% Test 3.70E-02 7.55E-01 90
25%
Train
75%
Train 9.08E-02 9.66E-01
100
Train Dev 2.05E-09 4.33E-05 0
Train Test 8.37E-23 1.18E-14 0
Dev Test 2.72E-04 2.11E-02 0
Table 1: p-values representing the similarity between
(parts of) the train, test and development sets.
cle level), it is consistent with the granularity used
for propaganda detection, which is also at the sen-
tence level. We also perform measurements of self
similarity after splitting the data at the article level
and find that the conclusions of similarity between
the sets hold with a p-value threshold of 0.001,
where p-values for similarity between the train-
ing and dev/test sets are orders of magnitude lower
compared to self-similarity. Since we use random
sampling we run this test 10 times and present the
both the maximum and minimum p-values. We in-
clude the similarity between 25% of a dataset and
the remaining 75% of that set because that is the
train/test ratio we use in our experiments, further
described in our methodology (Section 4).
This analysis shows that while all splits of each
of the datasets are statistically similar, the train-
ing set (and the split of the training set that we
use for experimentation) are significantly differ-
ent from the development and test sets. While our
analysis does show that the development and the
test sets are dissimilar, we note (based on the p-
values) that they are significantly more similar to
each other than they are to the training set.
4 Methodology
We were provided with two tasks: (1) propaganda
fragment-level identification (FLC) and (2) pro-
pagandistic sentence-level identification (SLC).
While we develop systems for both tasks, our main
focus is toward the latter. Given the differences
between the training, development, and test sets,
we focus on methods for generalising our models.
We note that propaganda identification is, in gen-
eral, an imbalanced binary classification problem
as most sentences are not propagandistic.
Due to the non-deterministic nature of fast GPU
computations, we run each of our models three
times and report the average of these three runs
Sentence 1:
The Senate Judiciary Committee voted 11-10 along party lines to advance the nomination of Judge
Brett Kavanaugh out of committee to the Senate floor for a vote.
Sentence 2:
Of course, RINO Senator Jeff Flake (R-AZ) wanted to side with Senate Democrats in pushing for a
FBI investigation into unsubstantiated allegations against Kavanaugh.
Sentence 3:
Outgoing Flake, and <LOADED LANGUAGE> good riddance </LOADED LANGUAGE>, said that
he sided with his colleagues in having a ”limited time and scope” investigation by the FBI into the
allegations against Kavanaugh.
Sentence 4:
“<FLAG-WAVING> This country is being ripped apart here, and we’ve got to make sure we do
due diligence</FLAG-WAVING>,” Flake said.
Sentence 5: He added that he would be more ”comfortable” with an FBI investigation.
Sentence 6: Comfort?
Sentence 7:
<WHATABOUTISM>What about Judge Kavanaugh’s comfort in being put through the ringer
without a shred of evidence, Senator Flake</WHATABOUTISM>?
Figure 1: Excerpt of an example (truncated) news document with three separate field-level classification (FLC)
tags, for LOADED LANGUAGE, FLAG-WAVING, AND WHATABOUTISM.
through the rest of this section. When picking the
model to use for our final submission, we pick the
model that performs best on the development set.
When testing our models, we split the labelled
training data into two non-overlapping parts: the
first one, consisting of 75% of the training data is
used to train models, whereas the other is used to
test the effectiveness of the models. All models
are trained and tested on the same split to ensure
comparability. Similarly, to ensure that our mod-
els remain comparable, we continue to train on the
same 75% of the training set even when testing on
the development set.
Once the best model is found using these meth-
ods, we train that model on all of the training data
available before then submitting the results on the
development set to the leaderboard. These results
are detailed in the section describing our results
(Section 5).
4.1 Class Imbalance in Sentence Level
Classification
The sentence level classification task is an imbal-
anced binary classification problem that we ad-
dress using BERT (Devlin et al., 2018). We use
BERTBASE, uncased, which consists of 12 self-
attention layers, and returns a 768-dimension vec-
tor that representation a sentence. So as to make
use of BERT for sentence classification, we in-
clude a fully connected layer on top of the BERT
self-attention layers, which classifies the sentence
embedding provided by BERT into the two classes
of interest (propaganda or non-propaganda).
We attempt to exploit various data augmenta-
tion techniques to address the problem of class im-
balance. Table 2 shows the results of our experi-
ments for different data augmentation techniques
when, after shuffling the training data, we train the
model on 75% of the training data and test it on the
remaining 25% of the training data and the devel-
opment data.
Augmentation
Technique
f1-score on
25% of Train
f1-score on
Dev
None 0.7954 0.5803
Synonym
Insertion 0.7889
0.5833
Dropping
Words 0.7791
0.5445
Over Sampling 0.7843 0.6276
Table 2: F1 scores on an unseen (not used for train-
ing) part of the training set and the development set on
BERT using different augmentation techniques.
We observe that BERT without augmentation
consistently outperforms BERT with augmenta-
tion in the experiments when the model is trained
on 75% of the training data and evaluated on the
rest, i.e trained and evaluated on similar data,
coming from the same distribution. This is con-
sistent with observations by Wei et al. (2019) that
contextual word embeddings do not gain from data
augmentation. The fact that we shuffle the training
data prior to splitting it into training and testing
subsets could imply that the model is learning to
associate topic words, such as ‘Mueller’, as pro-
paganda. However, when we perform model eval-
uation using the development set, which is dissim-
ilar to the training, we observe that synonym in-
sertion and word dropping techniques also do not
bring performance gains, while random oversam-
pling increases performance over base BERT by
4%. Synonym insertion provides results very sim-
ilar to base BERT, while random deletion harms
model performance producing lower scores. We
believe that this could be attributed to the fact that
synonym insertion and random word dropping in-
volve the introduction of noise to the data, while
oversampling does not. As we are working with
natural language data, this type of noise can in fact
change the meaning of the sentence. Oversam-
pling on the other hand purely increases the impor-
tance of the minority class by repeating training on
the unchanged instances.
So as to better understand the aspects of over-
sampling that contribute to these gains, we per-
form a class-wise performance analysis of BERT
with/without oversampling. The results of these
experiments (Table 3) show that oversampling in-
creases the overall recall while maintaining preci-
sion. This is achieved by significantly improving
the recall of the minority class (propaganda) at the
cost of the recall of the majority class.
OS No OS
precision 0.7967 0.7933
recall 0.7767 0.8000
f1-score 0.7843 0.7954
Non-Propaganda
precision 0.8733
0.8467
Non-Propaganda recall 0.8100 0.8900
Non-Propaganda F1 0.8433 0.8667
Propaganda precision 0.5800 0.6600
Propaganda recall 0.6933 0.5533
Propaganda F1 0.6300 0.6033
Table 3: Class-wise precision and recall with and with-
out oversampling (OS) achieved on unseen part of the
training set.
So far we have been able to establish that a) the
training and test sets are dissimilar, thus requir-
ing us to generalise our model, b) oversampling
provides a method of generalisation, and c) over-
sampling does this while maintaining recall on the
minority (and thus more interesting) class.
Given this we explore alternative methods of
increasing minority class recall without a signif-
icant drop in precision. One such method is
cost-sensitive classification, which differs from
random oversampling in that it provides a
more continuous-valued and consistent method of
weighting samples of imbalanced training data;
for example, random oversampling will inevitably
emphasise some training instances at the expense
of others. We detail our methods of using cost-
sensitive classification in the next section. Further
experiments with oversampling might have pro-
vided insights into the relationships between these
methods, which we leave for future exploration.
4.2 Cost-sensitive Classification
As discussed in Section 2.2.1, cost-sensitive clas-
sification can be performed by weighting the cost
function. We increase the weight of incorrectly la-
belling a propagandistic sentence by altering the
cost function of the training of the final fully con-
nected layer of our model previously described in
Section 4.1. We make these changes through the
use of PyTorch (Paszke et al., 2017) which cal-
culates the cross-entropy loss for a single predic-
tion x, an array where the jth element represents
the models prediction for class j, labelled with the
class class as given by Equation 1.
loss(x, class) = − log
(
exp(x[class])∑
j exp(x[j])
)
= −x[class] + log
∑
j
exp(x[j])
 (1)
The cross-entropy loss given in Equation 1 is
modified to accommodate an array weight, the ith
element of which represents the weight of the ith
class, as described in Equation 2.
loss(x, class) = weight[class]Θ
where, Θ = −x[class] + log
∑
j
exp(x[j])

(2)
Intuitively, we increase the cost of getting the
classification of an “important” class wrong and
corresponding decrees the cost of getting a less
important class wrong. In our case, we increase
the cost of mislabelling the minority class which is
“propaganda” (as opposed to “non-propaganda”).
We expect the effect of this to be similar to that
of oversampling, in that it is likely to enable us
to increase the recall of the minority class thus
resulting in the decrease in recall of the overall
model while maintaining high precision. We re-
iterate that this specific change to a model results
in increasing the model’s ability to better identify
elements belonging to the minority class in dissim-
ilar datasets when using BERT.
We explore the validity of this by perform-
ing several experiments with different weights as-
signed to the minority class. We note that in our
experiments use significantly higher weights than
the weights proportional to class frequencies in the
Figure 2: The impact of modifying the minority class
weights on the performance on similar (subset of train-
ing set) and dissimilar (development) datasets. The
method of increasing minority class weights is able to
push the model towards generalisation while maintain-
ing precision.
training data, that are common in literature (Ling
and Sheng, 2011). Rather than directly using the
class proportions of the training set, we show that
tuning weights based on performance on the de-
velopment set is more beneficial. Figure 2 shows
the results of these experiments wherein we are
able to maintain the precision on the subset of the
training set used for testing while reducing its re-
call and thus generalising the model. The fact that
the model is generalising on a dissimilar dataset
is confirmed by the increase in the development
set F1 score. We note that the gains are not infi-
nite and that a balance must be struck based on the
amount of generalisation and the corresponding
loss in accuracy. The exact weight to use for the
best transfer of classification accuracy is related
to the dissimilarity of that other dataset and hence
is to be obtained experimentally through hyperpa-
rameter search. Our experiments showed that a
value of 4 is best suited for this task.
We do not include the complete results of our
experiments here due to space constraints but in-
clude them along with charts and program code on
our project website. Based on this exploration we
find that the best weights for this particular dataset
are 1 for non-propaganda and 4 for propaganda
and we use this to train the final model used to
submit results to the leaderboard. We also found
that adding Part of Speech tags and Named En-
tity information to BERT embeddings by concate-
nating these one-hot vectors to the BERT embed-
dings does not improve model performance. We
describe these results in Section 5.
4.3 Fragment-level classification (FLC)
In addition to participating in the Sentence Level
Classification task we also participate in the Frag-
ment Level Classification task. We note that ex-
tracting fragments that are propagandistic is sim-
ilar to the task of Named Entity Recognition, in
that they are both span extraction tasks, and so use
a BERT based model designed for this task - We
build on the work by Emelyanov and Artemova
(2019) which makes use of Continuous Random
Field stacked on top of an LSTM to predict spans.
This architecture is standard amongst state of the
art models that perform span identification.
While the same span of text cannot have multi-
ple named entity labels, it can have different pro-
paganda labels. We get around this problem by
picking one of the labels at random. Addition-
ally, so as to speed up training, we only train our
model on those sentences that contain some propa-
gandistic fragment. In hindsight, we note that both
these decisions were not ideal and discuss what we
might have otherwise done in Section 7.
5 Results
In this section, we show our rankings on the
leaderboard on the test set. Unlike the previous ex-
ploratory sections, in which we trained our model
on part of the training set, we train models de-
scribed in this section on the complete training set.
5.1 Results on the SLC task
Our best performing model, selected on the ba-
sis of a systematic analysis of the relationship
between cost weights and recall, places us sec-
ond amongst the 25 teams that submitted their re-
sults on this task. We present our score on the
test set alongside those of comparable teams in
Table 4. We note that the task description pa-
per (Da San Martino et al., 2019) describes a
method of achieving an F1 score of 60.98% on
a similar task although this reported score is not
directly comparable to the results on this task be-
cause of the differences in testing sets.
5.2 Results on the FLC task
We train the model described in Section 4.3 on
the complete training set before submitting to the
leaderboard. Our best performing model was
Rank Team F1 Precision Recall
1 ltuorp 0.632375 0.602885 0.664899
2 Proper-Gander 0.625651 0.564957
0.700954
3 YMJA 0.624934 0.625265 0.624602
. . .
20 Baseline 0.434701 0.388010 0.494168
Table 4: Our results on the SLC task (2nd, in bold)
alongside comparable results from the competition
leaderboard.
placed 7th amongst the 13 teams that submitted
results for this task. We present our score on
the test set alongside those of comparable teams
in Table 5. We note that the task description
paper (Da San Martino et al., 2019) describes a
method of achieving an F1 score of 22.58% on a
similar task although, this reported score is not di-
rectly comparable to the results on this task.
Rank Team F1 Precision Recall
1 newspeak 0.248849 0.286299 0.220063
2 Anti-ganda 0.226745 0.288213
0.186887
. . .
6 aschern 0.109060 0.071528 0.229464
7 Proper-Gander 0.098969 0.065167
0.205634
. . .
11 Baseline 0.000015 0.011628 0.000008
Table 5: Our results on the FLC task (7th, in bold)
alongside those of better performing teams from the
competition leaderboard.
One of the major setbacks to our method for
identifying sentence fragments was the loss of
training data as a result of randomly picking one
label when the same fragment had multiple labels.
This could have been avoided by training differ-
ent models for each label and simply concatenat-
ing the results. Additionally, training on all sen-
tences, including those that did not contain any
fragments labelled as propagandistic would have
likely improved our model performance. We in-
tend to perform these experiments as part of our
ongoing research.
6 Issues of Decontextualization in
Automated Propaganda Detection
It is worth reflecting on the nature of the shared
task dataset (PTC corpus) and its structural cor-
respondence (or lack thereof) to some of the
definitions of propaganda mentioned in the in-
troduction. First, propaganda is a social phe-
nomenon and takes place as an act of communi-
cation (O’Shaughnessy, 2005, 13-14), and so it
is more than a simple information-theoretic mes-
sage of zeros and ones—it also incorporates an
addresser and addressee(s), each in phatic con-
tact (typically via broadcast media), ideally with
a shared denotational code and contextual sur-
round(s) (Jakobson, 1960).
As such, a dataset of decontextualised docu-
ments with labelled sentences, devoid of autho-
rial or publisher metadata, has taken us at some
remove from even a simple everyday definition of
propaganda. Our models for this shared task can-
not easily incorporate information about the ad-
dresser or addressee; are left to assume a shared
denotational code between author and reader (one
perhaps simulated with the use of pre-trained word
embeddings); and they are unaware of when or
where the act(s) of propagandistic communication
took place. This slipperiness is illustrated in our
example document (Fig. 1): note that while Sen-
tences 3 and 7, labelled as propaganda, reflect a
propagandistic attitude on the part of the journal-
ist and/or publisher, Sentence 4—also labelled as
propaganda in the training data—instead reflects a
“flag-waving” propagandistic attitude on the part
of U.S. congressman Jeff Flake, via the conven-
tions of reported speech (Volosˇinov, 1973, 115-
130). While reported speech often is signaled by
specific morphosyntactic patterns (e.g. the use
of double-quotes and “Flake said”) (Spronck and
Nikitina, 2019), we argue that human readers rou-
tinely distinguish propagandistic reportage from
the propagandastic speech acts of its subjects, and
to conflate these categories in a propaganda detec-
tion corpus may contribute to the occurrence of
false positives/negatives.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
In this work we have presented a method of in-
corporating cost-sensitivity into BERT to allow for
better generalisation and additionally, we provide
a simple measure of corpus similarity to determine
when this method is likely to be useful. We intend
to extend our analysis of the ability to generalise
models to less similar data by experimenting on
other datasets and models. We hope that the re-
lease of program code and documentation will al-
low the research community to help in this exper-
imentation while exploiting these methods.
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